Shigeru Ishiba’s premiership could be short

After a 15-day election campaign, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has elected Shigeru Ishiba as its president. Since the ruling party holds a majority in the National Diet (parliament), Mr Ishiba will be Japan’s next prime minister. For the 67-year-old Mr Ishiba, long a leading rival of the late Shinzo Abe, ascending to the post is the realisation of a long-held dream. But Mr Ishiba’s political star will likely soon fall.
There are several reasons for this. For starters, Mr Ishiba’s proposal of an “Asian Nato” is utterly unrealistic and will not withstand debate in the Diet. While Mr Ishiba portrays himself as a security expert, he seems to lack some fundamental perspective.
Nato’s defining feature is its guarantee of mutual defence: an attack on a member state is regarded as an attack on one’s own country. Japan, through Abe’s tireless efforts, achieved partial collectivisation of self-defence back in 2015. But, reflecting strong domestic anti-military sentiment, the scope for collective self-defence was limited to situations where Japan’s survival was at stake.
An Asian Nato, by contrast, implies Japan would have to be ready to assist if, say, the US were attacked in the Indian Ocean. Likewise, should Australia, a likely member state, clash with the Chinese navy, Japan would need to engage in collective self-defence.
Perhaps Mr Ishiba’s main intention is to institutionalise US involvement in the Indo-Pacific more firmly. In that case, he would need to present arguments for how an Asian Nato would be a net gain for the US. An Asian Nato would change little from today’s arrangements, whereby Japan hosts the bulk of America’s forward-deployed combat power in Asia — forces which continually carry out active joint exercises with Australia and India to remind China of the high cost of military adventurism.
That brings us to an even more serious problem with Mr Ishiba’s proposal: Taiwan. Should Taiwan come under the control of China’s Communist regime, Japan’s strategic sphere would be significantly constricted — psychologically, militarily, and commercially. Would other countries join an Asian Nato whose most worrying point of defence is Taiwan? The prospects for this seem bleak.
And then there’s the question of India. When Abe brought India into the Quad, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, he did so in the knowledge that India, constantly in tension with neighbouring China, wanted to maintain its longstanding relationship with Russia. Even as it joins the Quad, India would likely refuse to join an Asian Nato rather than risk that relationship. Testing India in this regard should be avoided.
Mr Ishiba’s political prospects are also burdened by his call for tax increases — both personal and corporate income taxes, and he has shown enthusiasm for taxing capital gains as well. Does he genuinely believe that he can win an election on a platform of tax hikes?
And the LDP’s need to prevail in the coming elections is the main reason Mr Ishiba was chosen. The House of Councillors (the Upper House) renews half of its seats every three years, with the next election scheduled for July 2025. The current term of the House of Representatives (the Lower House) lasts until October 2025. Mr Ishiba will probably use this opportunity to dissolve the Lower House and call an election to secure a majority and boost his administration. If he fails to dissolve the house in the coming months, he may hold elections for both houses next July.
Fortunately for him, Japan’s economy is not in bad shape. Nominal GDP is at an all-time high, as are tax revenues. But private-sector demand has not fully recovered, suggesting that this is no time for a tax hike.
A third key reason to doubt Mr Ishiba’s political longevity concerns the loyalty of those who form his government. When a Japanese administration is short-lived, its demise generally results from scandals involving cabinet ministers or defections within the prime minister’s entourage in the Kantei, or the Prime Minister’s Residence.
Mr Ishiba previously served as Minister of Defence. I have always been struck by the uniformity of their reaction when asked about Mr Ishiba’s tenure. They offer no clear answers, but uniformly frown when responding.
The prime minister’s responsibilities are far more daunting than the defence minister’s. Some 99% of the job is dealing with setbacks.
Moreover, Japan’s Diet demands 7.4 times more of the prime minister’s time than the British Parliament does of its prime minister. To be bound to a small chair in the Diet, maintaining composure under relentless opposition attacks, is no easy task.
Japan can ill-afford a return to the era of short-lived premierships that preceded Abe’s tenure. Unfortunately, Mr Ishiba’s policy positions and questionable management skills do not bode well. Let us hope that he can learn quickly and mature. ©2024 Project Syndicate
Taniguchi Tomohiko is a former special adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Cabinet.